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11. INDUSTRY BACKGROUND
Commuter air carriers operate under Part 298 of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board's Economic Regulations as a sub-classification of air
taxi operators. Commuters perform at least five round trips per week between two or
more points pursuant to published flight schedules, or transport mail
under contract with the U.S. Postal Service. They are currently
allowed to operate aircraft with a maximum passenger capacity of 30 seats
and a maximum payload capacity of up to 7,500 pounds. Apart from
these aircraft capacity limitations, the CAB imposes almost no regulatory
controls over commuter carriers: there is complete freedom of entry and exit
from markets, and no rate or route control. Part 298 regulations, however, do
require that commuter carriers register with the CAB, report certain operating
and traffic statistics, carry a specified level of liability insurance and
waive liability limits under the Warsaw Convention. The commuters are also
subject to varying degrees of safety and operational regulations of the
Federal Aviation Administration, depending on the type of equipment that
they operate.
In addition to the limited regulation at the federal level, in recent
years some states have exercised varying degrees of regulation of the com-
muter air carriers which operate within their jurisdiction. State regulation
has tended to be far more extensive than federal regulation and has often in-
cluded entry and exit controls, and rate/reporting regulations. In some more
heavily regulated states, state regulation has sometimes included specification
of a minimum number of flights; specification on aircraft size which differs
from that allowed by Part 298; route certificates; carrier justification for
'innmsniin 
,siggi
2beginning or suspending servicein a market, denied boarding regulations and
a number of other provisions. The following of the 48 contiguous states
have enacted some degree of commuter regulation: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington,
and Wyoming.*
Commuter air carriers are an increasingly important component of the
national air transportation sytem. This is evident form the growth in commuter
route networks form 1966 to 1974, shown in Figures I-1 and 1-2, to the point
where it is possible to cross the country using commuters.
Commuter air carrier traffic has grown rapidly since 1964 with traffic
more than doubling in the successive years 1968 and 1969. The number of com-
muter type operators, however, has fluctuated during the period. This is shown
in Table I-1. In addition to the variation over time within the industry, the
current size of commuters vari-es from those which carried fewer than 5,000 passengers
in 1973 to those which carried more than 200,000 passengers, or about 800 passen-
gers a day.**
In addition to the generally favorable climate at the CAB the late sixties
saw the development of two lightweight twin-engine turbine powered aircraft
that were almost ideally suited for larger commuter operations: the
DeHavilland of Canada DHC-6 Twin Otter and the Beech Aircraft B-99. This
was a case of technology practically creating a market: in the quarter ended
December 31, 1973, 171 of these aircraft were in service out of a total of 210
*
National Air Transportation Conferences, 1971
**NATA Commuter Airline Assocation, The Commuter Airline Industry, Annual
Report 1973 (Washington, D.C., 1974).
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turbine powered aircraft operated by the commuters. Table 1-2 shows the
pattern of growth of the commuter air carrier industry fleet from 1965. It
can be seen that the growth of traffic has been met by an expansion of the larger
aircraft classes, rather than an overall increase in number of aircraft.
Table 1-3 presents various statistics which show the current role of
the commuter airline industry in the air transportation system of the
United States. An average trip length of 100 miles indicates the short-
haul character of commuter service. Although commuters basically connect
passengers to other certificated carrier flights, origin and destination-
type passengers also exist. Commuters now constitute over 3% of the total
U.S. domestic passenger market, while providing passenger service at about
half the airports that receive scheduled service. Furthermore, commuters
offer the only scheduled passenger flights at about half the cities they
serve; these exclusive points tend to be small, low density communities at
which commuters can provide the only economical air service.
An analysis of 1974 data shows that there were over 665 airports in
the 50 states served by 30 certificated carriers and 131 commuter carriers. Of
these, 256 or 38.5 percent were served solely by the certificated carriers,
210 or 31.6 percent were served jointly by both groups of carriers. The
analysis further shows that in serving the 409 airports, the commuters provided
service in over 1,700 city-pairs by connecting with certificated carriers.*
Table 1-4 shows the distribution of service by the numberofcarriers in the 665
airports served by the commuters.
*NATA Commuter Airline Association, Commuter Airlines, Report Number 3,
July 1975.
Replacement began on July 17, 1967, when Apache, a scheduled air taxi,
was authorized by the CAB to provide substitute service for American Airlines
at Douglas, Arizona.* Thereafter suspension of certificated carrier opera-
tions at marginal points in favor of commuter carriers became a part of
CAB policy. As of January 1975, replacement service was in effect at forty-
nine points, forty seven for local service carriers and two for trunkline
carriers.
In many cases applications for suspension/substitution have involved a
service agreement between the commuter and the certificated carrier. The
nature of the agreements has varied, but the most comprehensive have been
those contracted under the "Allegheny Commuter" program.** Subject to CAB
approval, Allegheny has selected its commuters, awarded them ten-year con-
tracts, and guaranteed a breakeven financial result during the first two
years through subsidy. Carriers so chosen go by the name "Allegheny Commuter,"
painting their aircraft in Allegheny colors and offering joint fares. Allegheny
provides its computerized reservation service, interline ticketing and
baggage handling, and includes the complete schedules of the commuters in
its own timetable. In return Allegheny requires that the commuter carry the
same level of liability insurance as it does itself, that flights have a uni-
formed captain and first officer, and operations have a 95% completion fac-
tor. (An interesting sidelight to Allegheny Commuter traffic statistics is
*
CAB Report to Congress, Fiscal 1968, p.119.
**CAB Bureau of Operating Rights Staff Study, Service to Small Communities:
Part 2 (March, 1972), p. 35-38.
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that because the tickets are written on Allegheny stock, this commuter traffic
appears in the CAB O-D statistics as Allegheny traffic).
Closely related to the issue of substitution of commuters for certifi-
cated service is the issue of subsidy. Some of the routes where commuters re-
placed certificated carriers had been served on a subsidy basis. The need for
air service to isolated communities and the difficulties in providing that
service gave rise to both the CAB's Competitive Bid Proposal and to the
Flow-Through Subsidy alternative. Although the former remained a proposal
the latter was implemented in 1974 by allowing Air Midwest to receive flow-
through subsidy as a replacement for service by Frontier Airlines. Air Mid-
west received $132,000 annually in flow-through subsidy until the U.S. Appeals
Court said the Board could not subsidize an air carrier which is not certifi-
cated. To insure service to communities for which it had received subsidy,
Air Midwest has requested the CAB for a temporary certificate.* Cochise
Airlines is expected to follow suit.**
At the time that Air New England began operations in late 1970, the com-
muter air carrier industry was relatively stable; the technology of small
aircraft had advanced to the point where the appropriately sized aircraft
(B-99, Twin Otter which had proven acceptable to the travelling public)
existed to serve markets of medium size; and the regulatory environment was
such as to allow competition to take place in the commuter markets.
* Aviation Daily, Vol. 221, No.3, (Sept. 4, 1975), p.171.
**Aviation Daily, Vol. 221, No. 7, (Sept. 10, 1975), p.52.
Table 1-1
Commuter Industry Traffic Growth*
Year Number of Passengers Number of Operators
1964 199,000 32
1965 223,000 82
1966 328,000 116
1967 553,000 165
1968 725,000 240
1969 1,800,000 153
1970 4,300,000 -183
1971 4,700,000 161
1972 5,200,000 184
1973 5,700,000 216
1974 6,800',000 213
*Source: CAB Statistics ; National Air Taxi Conference prior to 1970
TABLE 1-2
COMMUTER AIR CARRIER FLEET
(by Aircraft Type)*
Aircraft Type
Year
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Fixed Wing
Jet 7
Turboprop 1 4 22 118 200 187 175 171 191 216
Single-engine
Piston '105 150 200 318 141 124 103 94 125 169
Multi-engine
Piston 249 348 452 814 515 424 459 455 504 550
Helicopters
6 7 9 18 8 6 6 23 8 2
TOTAL 361 570 685 1272 864 741 743 751 845 1982
Sources: (1) Commuter Air Carrier Operators as of Sept.,1969,
(2) Commuter Air Carrier
(3) Commuter Air Carrier
June 30,
Operators as of Sept.,1972,
Traffic Statistics,
1973, CAB
(4) Commuter Air Carrier Traffic Statistics,
June 30, 1974, CAB
FAA
FAA
Year Ended
Year Ended
MIX
Table 1-3
Comparison of Domestic Trunk Airlines, Local Service Airlines
and Commuter Air Carriers* (Year ended December 31, 1973)
Passengers
(000)
Revenue Pas.
Miles (000)
Departures Ave. Passenger
(000) Trip Lenqth (m)
Domestic
Trunk Airlines 144,800 115,400,000 3,020 797 10 204
Local
Service Airlines 32,450 9,827,000 1,527 303 8 412
Commuter
Air Carriers 5,690 576,000 925 101 216 550
*Source: CAB statistics
Number of
Carriers
Airports
Served
urnI
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Table 1-4
Distribution of Service By Number of Commuter Air Carriers*
Number of Commuters Number of Airports Percent of Airports
365
131
10 or more 30
665
54.9
19.7
9.2
4.1
1.6
3.2
0.6
1.6
0.6
4.5
100.0%
Source: NATA Commuter Airline Association, Commuter Airlines, Report
Number 3, July 1975, p.34.
2. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF AIR NEW ENGLAND
Summer 1970 - Policy disagreements at Executive Airlines between Walter
Beinecke, majority stockholder, and Joe Whitney, President
since 1962 (when the airline began operations), lead to de-
parture of Whitney and others at Executive. During 1970
Executive grosses $8 million and has deficit of $4 million.
Fall 1970 - Whitney and some associates join forces with George Parmenter
(formerly founder & president of bankrupt Cape & Island Air-
lines) to form Air New England and begin operations on the
Cape and Island routes.
December 31, New England Service Investigation (Docket 22973) begins.
1970
December 10,- Executive Airlines files for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of
1971 the Bankruptcy Act, reorganizingits New England operations and
totally dropping its Florida operations.
February 9, - Beinecke relinquishes control of Executive Airlines to group
1972 headed by Henry Harding.
July, 1972 - Associated New England Airlines, a loose conglomerate of
six commuters (Air New England, Aroostook Airways, Bar Har-
bor Airways, Command Airways, Downeast Airlines, and Win-
nipesaukee Aviation) files a plan with the CAB to receive
subsidy eligible certificates for specific points. Air
New England proposes service on the following routes with
a fleet of 5 DC-3's, 5 F-27's and 5 DHC-6's: (1) Boston-
Hyannis-Martha's Vineyard-Nantucket; (2) New York-New Bedford-
Martha's Vineyard-Nantucket-Hyannis; (3) Boston-Lebanon-
Montpelier-Burlington; (4) New York-Lebanon-Montpelier-Bur-
lington-Portland; (5) Boston-Augusta-Waterville; and (6)
August, 1972-
November 1, -
1972
December 4, -
1972
December 5, -
1972
December 20,-
1972
July 9, 1973-
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New York-Portland-Augusta. For this operation, Air New England
forecasts revenues of $8.29 million in 1973 with an operating loss
of $233,548. The company anticipates it will require $679,798
in subsidy during the year to undertake the proposed operations.
Executive Airlines also files for subsidy eligible certifi-
cation for a somewhat larger route structure, using six
CV-580's and five DHC-6's. Total subsidy need is estimated
at $721,000 annually.
Northeast Airlines is merged into Delta Air Lines.
Executive Airlines emerges from bankruptcy following a
stringent cost reduction program and layoff of about
75% of personnel.
CAB's Bureau of Operating Rights opposes certification of
any commuters in New England.
Executive Airlines asks CAB to prohibit commuters from
starting new services at markets in question in New Eng-
land until the New England Service Investigation is completed. Fol-
lowing announcement of plans by Air New England, Executive said:
"The schedules and fares proposed by Air New.England cons-
titute a flagrant case of predatory and destructive com-
petitive practices designed to drive Executive out of
business..."
Air New England adds Burlington, Vt., Barre/Montpelier, Vt.
and Lebanon, N.H. to its route system.
In the initial decision in the New England Service Investigation,
CAB Administrative Law Judge Murphy says that commuters can
provide adequate service in New England without certification.
IINI'li 111dil 111110IN1111 WAHL i ,
December 19,- Executive Airlines goes out of business effective Dec-
1973 ember 21. Air New England purchases some of its assets
and says it will try to fill any service void created by
Executive's departure.
July 17, - The Civil Aeronautics Board, in a unanimous decision in the
1974 New England Service Investigation, certificates Air New
England effective October 15, 1974. Joe Whitney tells
Aviation Daily: "We anticipate our subsidy need to be zero.
We are having a very successful year and should be extremely
profitable. We see no reason to drastically change that
just because of the CAB order. We have been looking at fleet
improvements mainly under Part 298(small aircraft) require-
ments. Now, of course, we will be reviewing our fleet as a
local service carrier. We don't intend to go out and buy
airplanes because we are eligible for subsidy. We would
rather stay in the profit column." Whitney says Air New
England expects 110% revenue growth to about $9 million,
compared to 1973 revenues of $4.6 million.
July 19, - Quoted in Aviation Daily, Sen. Norris Cotton (R-N.H.), views the
1974 CAB decision "as a personal victory in a very long, arduous
and difficult struggle." Cotton says the Board's decision is
not far removed from what he had realistically hoped for.
Cotton, perhaps one of most vocal critics of CAB, compliments
the Board for its show of backbone by disagreeing with portions
of the law judge's decision, the position taken by the Bureau
of Operating Rights "and much to my own self-gratification,
the position of the Department of Transportation."
Cotton expressed his pleasure with the CAB decision during
senate aviation subcommittee confirmation hearings yesterday
for CAB Member Richard J.O'Melia and credited O'Melia with
October 11, -
1974
November 12,-
1974
December 2, -
1974
December 23,-
1974
January 21, -
1975
January 24, -
1975
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playing a large part in the Board's decision. When
O'Melia was first appointed to the Board, he personally
"traveled through the northern New England region receiving
first-hand knowledge of our air service problem. This I am
sure, was helpful to the Board in reaching its decision...,"
Cotton said.
CAB agrees to an Air New England petition delaying certifi-
cation to January 1, 1975.
Air New England announces plans to buy all six FH-227's of
Delta Air Lines.
Air New England petitions to keep operating as a Part 298
carrier until it is qualified for FAA licencing as a certi-
ficated airline. On December 20, the CAB agrees.
Air New England orders six SD 3-30's for delivery in February
1976. Aircraft are valued at $1.25 million each.
Delta Air Lines and Air New England ask CAB to approve a
loan of $1.5 million from Delta to Air New England.
Air New England certificate of public convenience and necessity
takes effect.
WE 11 
3. EVOLUTION OF ROUTE STRUCTURE, FARE POLICY AND COMPETITIVE POSITION
The growth of Air New England's route structure, fare structure, and
competitive position was analyzed for the four year period of its existence
as a commuter, December 1970 - December 1974. The analysis is based upon
data derived from the Official Airline Guide (OAG).
The analysis is split into nine periods, the Decembers and Junes
corresponding to the low and peak periods of traffic in the Northeast. For
each period, Air New England's route structure, fare structure, and competi-
tive position is discussed. A tenth section summarizes the key events and
strategies in Air New England's history as a commuter air carrier.
1. December 1970
Air New England began operations serving eight cities on a sparsely
connected network stretching from New York to Waterville, Maine (Figure
3-1). The network was composed of two markets, one in the Islands* and the
other in the North.* The Northern market was more highly connected, but
the Islands received greater frequencies of service, so that overall the
two markets were given equal attention.
There was considerable competition in New England at the time (Table
3-1). Executive Airlines, the dominant commuter carrier, had extensive routes
throughout the area, and competed with Air New England on nearly every route
the new carrier flew. Northeast Airlines, a regional carrier, flew routes
in and out of New York, and between Boston and Portland, Maine. Small
*Nantucket, Martha's Vineyard, Hyannis and New Bedford.
**Destinations in Vermont, New Hampshire and Maine.
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commuter competitors included Downeast Airlines, Aroostook Airways, and
Massachusetts Air Industries, each serving a single market.
Air New England originally set its fares equal to Executive's and
matched or underpriced its competitors in other markets.* An exception
was New York, where Air New England priced above Northeast's fares. This
exception remained true throughout the study period. The intense competi-
tion, therefore, was between Air New England and Executive for the small
city-pairs. The New York routes went to Northeast by default.**
2. June 1971
Air New England ended service to Waterville but initiated service to
Martha's Vineyard ( Figure 3-2 ). This change concentrated Air New England's
network around the Islands, to take advantage of the heavy summer tourist
traffic.
Competition in the Islands became intense with Air New England, Executive,
and Northeast all offering greatly expanded services, and Massachusetts Air
and North American Airlines also fighting for traffic (Table 3-2 ). For Air
New England, control of the Islands was essential since it was concentrating
nearly all of its effort there, whereas both Executive and Northeast had sub-
stantial networks elsewhere.
That summer Executive raised most of its fares while Air New England held
all of its fares constant. This change gave Air New England a competitive
advantage, particularly in the Islands where Executive made most of its fare
changes. Meanwhile Northeast charged the lowest fares on city pairs to New
*Table 10 lists Air New England's fares for every city-pair served over the
nine periods.
* It is assumed that Air New England did not seriously compete on a route unless
it priced at or below its main competitor.
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York and generally charged the highest fares elsewhere. The result was
that Air New England had equal or lower fares than its main competitors
on all markets except those into New York.
3. December 1971
Air New England thinned its network by deleting several city-pair
connections. Other than this seasonal shrinkage, its route structure was
unchanged ( Figure 3-3 ).
Competition in the islands between Air New England and Executive
continued at an aggressive pace, with both carriers offering near summer-
level frequencies ( Table 3-3 ). Meanwhile, Northeast pulled out of the
Islands for the winter, and Massachusetts Air and North American disappeared
forever.
As events later showed, the winter of 1971-72 was Executive's last
attempt to retain a prominent position in the islands. It lowered many of its
fares to match Air New England's and even undercut Air New England on the
New Bedford-Boston run. The intent of the fare cuts was to lessen Air New
England's competitive advantage; but as will be seen later, it was to no avail.
4. June 1972
Service was reinstated to Waterville by Air New England, where it flew
four times daily from Augusta, in competition with Executive. In the Islands,
Air New England's activity increased to the previous summer's level ( Figure 3-4 )-
Executive Airlines conceded the islands, flying but a single loop:
Boston-Nantucket-Martha's Vineyard-Boston ( Table 3-4). The two airlines
I
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flew roughly equal frequencies on competitive routes in the North, but
Executive flew to ten cities while Air NewEngland flew to only three (Boston
not included). Meanwhile, Northeast re-entered the Islands, again concentra-
ting on routes in and out of New York. Pilgrim Airlines initiated flights
between New York (JFK) and Boston at $23 one way, the lowest coach fare avail-
able.
Air New England held all of its fares constant except on the Boston-
Augusta flight where an increase coincided with an Executive increase,
retaining a relative price advantage. This advantage was network wide, a
result of Executive's fare increases a year earlier. Air New England continued
to price above Northeast Airlines on routes to New York and underprice Northeast
elsewhere. Table 3-10 shows this phenomenon to be true in every market where
the two airlines competed.
5. December 1972
As the Islands experienced their seasonal decline in-traffic, Delta (which
had absorbed Northeast) and Executive pulled out completely and Air New
England trimmed its schedule (Figure 3-5). Up North, however, Air New England
added a Boston-Waterville non-stop and held its frequencies at summer levels.
Air New England had captured sole control of the Islands; it now looked
to the North where Executive dominated. It strengthened its existing network
in the North, a harbinger of things.to come. Executive flew higher frequencies
on most routes, but it also charged a higher fare than Air New England
(Table 3-5).
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At last, Air New England started to raise fares, but only in the Islands
where its competition had just ended. In every market where it faced competi-
tion, it held its fare constant ( Table 3-10).
6. June 1973
Air New England had doubled its Northern network adding Lebanon, Montpelier,
Burlington, and a non-stop between Hyannis and Augusta (Figure 3-6). - Mean-
while, the Islands were maturing into a stable market, with only seasonal
changes occurring throughout the remainder of the study period.
The competitive battlefield shifted to the North where Air New England
was mounting a full scale assault. It flew to every city served by Executive,
except Lewiston and severely undercut Executive's fares on many of the
routes , as shown below. Executive responded by flying higher
Fares During June, 1973
ANE
City Pair Air New England Executive EX
AUG - PWM 8.50 16.00 53
- WVL 8.00 13.00 62
BTV - MPV 8.00 14.00 57
LEB - BTV 15.00 18.00 83
- MPV 8.00 15.00 53
frequencies than Air New England on most routes ( Tabl-e 3-6 ). Meanwhile in
the Islands, Delta was flying from New York and Executive flew Boston-Hyannis-
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Nantucket.
7. December 1973
Air New England's network thinned slightly, but no cities were added
or deleted (Figure 3-7).
Executive made the next move.* It reduced fares in the Northern market
and raised fares on flights from Boston so that all of its fares were $1-2
above Air New England's (Table 3-7 ). This gave Air New England a
system wide edge with fares ,but Executive continued running higher frequencies.
Illustrative Fare Changes Made by Executive
June
Air NE
26.00
8.50
8.00
28.00
21.00
24.00
1973
EX
26.00
16.00
13.00
28.00
21.00
24.00
December
Air NE
26.00
8.50
8.00
28.00
21.00
24.00
1973
EX
27.00
10.00
9.00
29.00
22.00
25.00
Delta flew routes out of New York and Boston, with Air New England over-
pricing the New York flights and underpricing the Boston flights. Air
New England was the lone carrier in the Islands.
*In fact, Executive sold its assets to Air New England on December 19, 1973.
The above was Executive's scheduled plan as recorded by the December 1973 QAG.
City Pair
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8. June 1974
Lewiston, Maine was added to Air New England's itinerary. This, with
numerous additional links in its system, gave its network excellent coverage
over the New England region ( Figure 3-8).
Executive Airlines went out of business in December 1973, leaving Air New
England and Delta as the two major carriers in the region. Delta entered the
Islands again and flew from Boston to Burlington and Portland (Table 3-8).
Air New England priced over Delta on New York and Boston flights and priced
under Delta elsewhere. Also, Bar Harbor Airlines began flights between
Boston and Portland and Pilgrim continued serving New York-Boston.
Now Air New England raised all of its fares to a level as high or higher
than Executive had been charging in December of 1973.
9. December 1974
No changes occurred: Delta made its seasonal withdrawal from the Islands
and Air New England reduced most of its frequencies.
10. Summary
Air New England captured the Northeast regional market by out-
performing Executive Airlines. It began by splitting the region into two
markets, the Islands and the North, then entering the Island market, the
stronger of the two, at fares and frequencies equal to Executive's. Executive
responded by raising its fares slightly. When Air New England appeared to be
gaining control, Executive lowered its fares to match Air New England's - but
lost its hold on the Island market despite this. Then Air New England expanded
into the Northern market at fares far below and frequencies slightly below
_ 
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Executive's. Executive responded by adjusting its fares to a level just
above Air New England's. Soon Executive went bankrupt, due in part to Air
New England's aggressive competition.
Air New England used several successful strategies. First, it entered
one market at a time, but entered the market completely. This was demon-
strated when it entered the Islands first and only later went into the North.
It also held its fares constant, while Executive's levels continually changed.
Only when it drove Executive out of a market did Air New England raise its
fares. It also offered a continuous, year round service, rather than entering
during the summer and leaving during the winter. This continuity gave Air
New England a greater identity with the market.
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TABLE 3-1 AIR NEW ENGLAND
CITY-PAIR COMPETITION, DECEMBER
AIR NEW ENGLAND
TO - FROM - FREQ0
COMPETITION
FARE COMP2 FRFOl
AUG - BOS 4-1/2 22.74
- PWM 2
BOS - AUG 4
- HYA 5
- ACK 2
- PWM 1
HYA -
ACK -
WVL
BOS
ACK
BOS
- HYA
- EWB
EWB - ACK
- LGA
LGA - EWB
- PWM
PWM - AUG
- LGA
WVL - BOS
8.50
22.74
15.50
18.50
16.00
25.00
15.50
11.00
18.50
8 11.00
1/2 12.00
1/2 12.00
3 28.00
3 28.00
3 39.00
2 8.50
3 39.00
2-1/2 25.00
1) The FREQ for a city-pair equals the sum of the values assigned to every flight
serving that city-pair.
made between the two citi
non-stops = 1
one-stops = 1/2
2) EX - Executive
IM - Mass. Air Ind.
NE - Northeast
The value of a flight depends upon the number of stops
es:
two stops = 1/4
> three stops =0
QK - Aroostook
XY - Downeast
DL - Delta
3) Airport Codes:
ACK - Nantucket
AUG - Augusta
BOS - Boston
BTV - Burlington
EWB - New Bedford
HYA - Hyannis
MVY - Martha's Vineyard
LEB - Lebannon
LEW - Lewiston
LGA - La Guardia
MPV - Montpelier
PWM - Portland
WVL - Waterville
(NY - New York, same as LGA)
4) Only city pairs where Air New England faced competition are shown; monopoly
routes are not included.
1970
FARR
EX
XY
QK
EX
XY
EX
EX
IM
EX
NE
EX
EX
EX
EX
6-1/2
3
2
7
3
4
2-1/2
1/2
8
7
4-1/2
4
3
1
1
2
1-1/2
2
2
2
1-1/2
1/2
22.74
23.00
15.44
22.74
23.00
15.50
18.50
17.28
16.00
17.00
25.00
15.00
11.00
18.50
17.28
11.00
14.04
14.04
21.00
21.00
31.00
8.50
31.00
25.00
FRFQl 'FA'P'F
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TABLE 3-2: AIR NEW ENGLAND
CITY-PAIR COMPETITION, JUNE 1971
AIR NEW ENGLAND COMPETITION
TO - FROM: FREQ FARE COMP FREQ FARE
AUG - BOS 1 22.74 EX 7 25.00
- PWM 3 8.50 EX 1/2 16.00
QK 2 15.44
BOS - AUG 1 22.74 EX 6 25.00
- HYA 7-1/2 15.50 EX 5 17.00
- MVY 3-1/2 18.50 EX 4 20.00
- ACK 5 18.50 EX 6 20.00
- LGA 0 35.00 EX 0 34.00
HYA - BOS 7 15.50 EX 8 17.00
- MUY 3-1/2 11.00 EX 2 13.00
- ACK 8-1/2 11.00 EX 4 14.00
- LGA 1 32.00 NE 3 28.00
MUY - BOX 4 18.50 EX 4-1/2 20.00
- HYA 4 11.00 EX 3 13.00
- ACK 5 11.00 EX 9 14.00
IM 3 11.88
- EWB 3 11.00 EX 2 13.00
IM 3 11.88
- LGA 2-1/2 32.00 EX 1/2 32.00
NE 3 28.00
ACK - BOS 3-1/2 18.50 EX 6 20.00
- HYA 7-1/2 11.00 EX 6-1/2 14.00
NE 2 16.00
- MUY 8 11.00 EX 8 14.00
NE 1 16.00
IM 3 11.88
ON 3 16.00
- EWB 3 12.00 EX 1 16.00
IM 1-1/2 15.39
- LGA 2 32.00 EX 0 35.00
NE 2-1/2 28.00
EWB - MUY 2 11.00 EX 2 13.00
NE 1 16.00
IM 3 11.88
- ACK 1-1/2 12.00 EX 1 16.00
IM 1-1/2 15.39
- LGA 5 28.00 EX 2 28.00
NE 1 23.00
LGA - BOS 0 35.00 EX 1/2 34.00
- HYA 2 32.00 NE 2-1/2 28.00
- MUY 2 32.00 EX 1/2 32.00
NE 2 28.00
- ACK 1 32.00 EX 0 35.00
NE 3 28.00
- EWB 5 28.00 EX 2 28.00
NE 1 23.00
- PWM 3 39.00 NE 3 33.00
PWM - AUG 3 8.50 EX 1 16.00
QK 2 15.44
- LGA 3 39.00 NE 3 33.00
, w. - --1 404 m 0 "' Wwwmlw wowel -
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TABLE 3-3 : AIR NEW ENGLAND
CITY-PAIR COMPETITION, DECEMBER 1971
AIR NEW ENGLAND COMPETITION
TO FROM FREQ
AUG - BOS
- PWM
BOS - AUG
- HYA
- MUY
- ACK
- EWB
- LGA
HYA - BOX
- MUY
- ACK
- EWB
- LGA
MUY - BOS
- HYA
- ACK
- EWB
- LGA
ACK - BOS
- HYA
- MUY
- EWB
- LGA
EWB - BOS
- HYA
- MUY
- ACK
- LGA
LGA - HYA
- MUY
- ACK
- EWB
- PWM
PWM - AUG
- LGA
1
3
1
5
1-
1-
0
0
7
5-
5-
3
1
2
5-
6
2
1
2
5-
5
1
0
3
3-
1
4
1
0
3
3
3
3
22.74
8.50
22.74
15.50
1/2 18.50
1/2 18.50
15.50
35.00
15.50
1/2 11.00
1/2 11.00
11.00
32.00
18.50
1/2 11.00
11.00
11.00
32.00
18.50
1/2 11.00
11.00
12.00
1/2 35.00
15.50
11.00
1/2 11.00
12.00
28.00
32.00
32.00
35.00
28.00
39.00
8.50
39.00
FARE COMP FREQ FARE
EX
QK
EX
EX
EX
EX
EX
EX
EX
EX
EX
EX
EX
EX
EX
EX
EX
EX
EX
EX
EX
EX
EX
EX
EX
EX
EX
EX
EX
EX
EX
EX
NE
QK
NE
4
2
4
5
2
2
0
1
5
5-1/2
5-1/2
2
1
2
4-1/2
3
3
0
2
4-1/2
5
1-1/2
0
1/2
3
1
1/2
2
1
0
0
2
1-1/2
2
2
25.00
15.44
25.00
17.00
20.00
20.00
15.00
34.00
17.00
13.00
14.00
11.00
30.00
20.00
13.00
11.00
11.00
32.00
20.00
14.00
11.00
12.00
32.00
15.50
11.00
11.00
12.00
28.00
30.00
32.00
32.00
28.00
33.00
15.44
33.00
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TABLE 3-4: AIR NEW ENGLAND
CITY-PAIR COMPETITION, JUNE 1972
AIR NEW ENGLAND COMPETITION
TO - FROM FREQ FARE COMP' FREQ
AUG - BOS 5
- PWM 3
BOS -
HYA -
MVY-
ACK -
WVL 4
AUG 5
MUY 4
ACK 6
NY 0
WVL 2
MUY 5
ACK 1
NY 1
BOS 4
HYA 7
ACK 6
NY 1
BOS 6
MUY 7
- NY
EWB - BOS
- LGA
NY - HYA
-MUY
- ACK
- EWB
- PWM
PWM - AUG
WVL-
-1/2
-1/2
1-1/2
-1/2
1
4
1-
1-
3
3
3
NY 3
AUG 4
BOS 2
24.00
8.50
8.00
24.00
18.50
18.50
35.00
26.00
11.00
11.00
32.00
18.50
11.00
11.00
32.00
18.50
11.00
1/2 35.00
15.50
28.00
1/2 32.00
1/2 32.00
1/2 35.00
28.00
39.00
8.50
39.00
8.00
26.00
FARE
EX
EX
QK
EX
EX
EX
EX
PM
EX
NE
NE
NE
EX
NE
EX
NE
NE
EX
EX
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
EX
QK
NE
EX
EX
4-1/2
1
2
4
4-1/2
5
4
1/2
2
1/2
4
2
4
3
4
1-1/2
3
5
2
1
1
1
1
2-1/2
3
1
1
2-1/2
1
2
3
4
2
26.00
16.00
15.00
13.00
26.00
20.00
20.00
23.00
28.00
16.00
16.00
28.00
20.00
16.00
11.00
16.00
28.00
20.00
11.00
16.00
28.00
16.00
23.00
28.00
28.00
28.00
23.00
33.00
16.00
15.00
33.00
13.00
28.00
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TABLE 3-5 AIR NEW ENGLAND
CITY-PAIR COMPETITION, DECEMBER 1972
AIR NEW ENGLAND
TO - 1~'ROM FREO FARE COMP
COMPETITON
FREQ-
AUG - BOS 4
- PWM 3
BOS -
EWB -
NY -
PWM -
a WVL-
WVL
AUG
EWB
NY
WVL
BOS
LGA
EWB
PWM
AUG
NY
AUG
BOS
3
4
1
0
1-1/2
24.00
8.50
8.00
24.00
15.50
35.00
26.00
15.50
28.00
28.00
39.00
8.50
3 39.00
3 8.00
2-1/2 26.00
FARE
EX
EX
QK
EX
EX
DL
PM
EX
DL
DL
DL
DL
EX
QK
DL
EX
EX
8
3-1/2
2
7
6
1
0
2-1/2
1
1
1
3
1-1/2
2
3-1/2
10
3-1/2
26.00
16.00
15.00
13.00
26.00
16.00
23.00
28.00
16.00
23.00
23.00
34.00
16.00
15.00
34.00
13.00
28.00
... -FO RO FA
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TABLE 3-6.: AIR NEW ENGLAND
CITY-PAIR COMPETITION, JUNE 1973
AIR NEW ENGLAND COMPETITION
TO FROM FREQ- FARE COmP FREQ FARE
AUG - BOS 4 26.00 EX 7 26.00
- PWM 3 8.50 EX 4 16.00
- WVL 3 8.00 EX 9 13.00
BOS - AUG 5 26.00 EX 7 26.00
- BTV 2 28.00 EX 3 28.00
DL 2 26.00
- HYA 14 16.00 EX 6 16.00
- LEB 5 21.00 EX 6 21.00
- MPV 4 24.00 EX 4-1/2 24.00
- ACK 6 21.00 EX 3 20.00
- EWB 2 15.50 DL 1 16.00
- WVL 1-1/2 28.00 EX 4 28.00
BTV - BOS 2 28.00 EX 2 28.00
DL 2 26.00
- MPV 3 8.00 EX 3 14.00
- LEB 1/2 15.00 EX 2-1/2 18.00
HYA - BOS 15 16.00 EX 5 16.00
MUY 6-1/2 11.00 DL 2-1/2 16.00
- ACK 10-1/2 12.51 EX 6 12.51
DL 2 16.00
- NY 2 32.00 DL 2 28.00
LEB - BOS 4 21.00 EX 8 21.00
- BTV 1/2 15.00 EX 2-1/2 18.00
- NPV 5 8.00 EX 3 15.00
- NY 3 30.00 DL 2 28.00
MVY - HYA 6 11.00 DL 1 16.00
- ACK 5 11.00 DL 1/2 16.00
- NY 1-1/2 35.00 DL 3 28.00
MTP - BOS 3-1/2 24.00 EX 2-1/2 24.00
- BTV 4 8.00 EX 4 14.00
- LEB 4 8.00 EX 5 15.00
ACK - BOS 6 21.00 EX 2-1/2 20.00
- HYA 11-1/2 12.51 EX 5 12.51
DL 2 16.00
- MUY 5 11.00 DL 2 16.00
- NY 2-1/2 35.00 DL 2 28.00
EWB - BOS 0 15.50 DL 1 16.00
- LGA 7 28.00 DL 1 23.00
NY - HYA 3 32.00 DL 2-1/2 28.00
- LEB 3 30.00 DL 2-1/2 28.00
- MY 2-1/2 35.00 DL 2 28.00
- ACK 1 35.00 DL 3 28.00
- EWB 5 28.00 DL 1 23.00
- PWM 3 39.00 DL 3-1/2 34.00
PWM - AUG 3 8.50 EX 1-1/2 16.00
- NY 3 39.00 DL 4 34.00
WVL - AUG 4 8.00 EX 10 13.00
- BOS 2 28.00 EX 4 28.00
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TABLE 3-7: AIR NEW ENGLAND
CITY-PAIR COMPETITION, DECEMBER 1973
AIR NEW ENGLAND
AUG -
BOS -
BTV-
LEB-
MPV-
EW-
NY-
PTV -
WVL -
BOS
PWM
WVL
AUG
BTV
LEB
MPV
EWB
NY
WVL
BOS
LEB
MPV
BOS
BTV
LGA
BOS
BTV
BOS
LGA
BOS
LEB
EWB
PWM
AUG
NY
AUG
BOS
COMP?
26.00
8.50
8.00
26.00
28.00
21.00
24.00
15.50
35.00
28.00
28.00
15.00
8.00
21.00
15.00
30.00
24.00
8.00
15.50
28.00
35.00
30.00
28.00
39.00
8.50
39.00
8.00
28.00
EX
EX
DL
PM
EX
EX
PM
COMPETITION
FREO
5-1/2
1
6
5
3
2
6
4
1
1-1/2
2-1/2
3
2
2
4
6
2
1-1/2
4
4
1
1
1
1-1/2
1
2-1/2
1/2
3
7
2-1/2
TO FROM FREQ O
2
4
5
2-1/2
3
2-1/2
5
1
5
0
3
FARE
22.00
10.00
9.00
27.00
29.00
26.00
22.00
25.00
16.00
23.00
29.00
29.00
26.00
11.00
9.00
22.00
11.00
28.00
25.00
9.00
16.00
23.00
23.00
28.00
23.00
34.00
10.00
34.00
9.00
29.00
TA VR () COH
Awl iii,1111 1011,111 ii,
FARE
TABLE 3-8 : AIR NEW ENGLAND
CITY-PAIR COMPETITION, JUNE 1974
AIR NEW ENGLAND COMPETITION
TO FROM FREQ FARE COMP FREQ FARE
BOS - BTV 4 31.00 DL 1 28.00
- EWR 1 18.00 DL 1 17.00
- NY 0 40.00 PM 1/2 23.00
- PWM 5 21.00 DL 5 20.00
QO 8 21.00
BTV - BOS 4 31.00 DL 1 28.00
HYA - MUY 7-1/2 13.00 DL 1-1/2 17.00
- ACK 19-1/2 14.00 DL 2 17.00
- LGA 3 36.00 DL 1 30.00
LEB - LGA 3 34.00 DL 1-1/2 30.00
MUY - HYA 9 13.00 DL 1 17.00
- ACK 6-1/2 13.00 DL 1/2 17.00
- LGA 5 39.00 DL 2 30.00
ACK - HYA 13-1/2 14.00 DL 1 17.00
- MUY 11 13.00 DL 1-1/2 17.00
- LGA 4 39.00 DL 2 30.00
EWB - BOS 1 18.00 DL 1 17.00
- LGA 5 32.00 DL 1 24.00
NY - BOS 0 40.00 PM 1 23.00
- HYA 3 36.00 DL 2 30.00
- LEB 2 34.00 DL 1-1/2 30.00
- MUY 5 39.00 DL 1-1/2 30.00
- ACK 4 39.00 DL 2 30.00
- EWB 3 32.00 DL 1 24.00
- PWM 2 44.00 DL 3 38.00
PWM - BOS 4 21.00 DL 5 20.00
QO 7 21.00
- LGA 3 44.00 DL 2 38.00
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TABLE 3-9: AIR NEW ENGLAND
CITY-PAIR COMPETITION, DECEMBER 1974
AIR NEW ENGLAND COMPETITION
TO FROM FREQ FARE COMP FREQ- FARE
BOS - BTV 4 31.00 DL 1 29.00
- EWB 2-1/2 18.00 DL 1 18.00
- NY 0 40.00 PM 1 25.00
- PWM 4 21.00 DL 6 21.00
QO 4 21.00
BTV - BOS 4 31.00 DL 1 29.00
LEB - LGA 3 34.00 DL 1-1/2 31.00
EWB - BOS 3 18.00 DL 1 18.00
- LGA 5 32.00 DL 1 25.00
NY - BOS 0 40.00 PM 1 25.00
- LEB 3 34.00 DL 1-1/2 31.00
- EWB 5 32.00 DL 1 25.00
- PWM 2 44.00 DL 2 40.00
PWM - BOS 4 21.00 DL 5 21.00
QO 7 21.00
- LGA 3 44.00 DL 1 40.00
, li 1114, m li
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TABLE 3-10: AIR NEW ENGLAND FARES
R = Relationship of Air New England's Fares to its Competitor's fares.
L = Less than
E = Equal to
G = Greater than
N = No Competition
CM = Competitor; if more than one exists, only the competitor flying the highest
FREQ is listed.
DECEMBER 70
FARE R CM
22.74 E EX
30.59 N
JUNE 71
FARE R
22.74 L
30.50 N
TO - FROM
AUG - OS
- HYA
- LEW
- MVY
- NY
- PWM
- WVL
BOS - BTV
- HYA
- LEB
- LEW
- MVY
- MPV
- ACK
- EWB
- NY
- PWM
- WVL
BTV - LEB
- MPV
HYA - LEB
- MVY
HYA - MPV
- ACK
- EWSB
- NY
- WVL
LEB - MPV
- NY
LEW - PWM
-WVL
NVY - ACK
- EWS
- NY
- WVL
MPV - NY
ACK - EWB
- NY
EWB - NY
15.50 I L IEX
18.50
18.50
35.00
18.50 E EX
16.00 E EX
25.00 E EX
11.00 IL
11.00
11.00
32.00
11.00
11.00
32.00
12.001 L
35.00 G
28.00
1q.0n
EX 11.00
11.00
11.00
32.00
11.00
11.00
32.00
12.00
35.00
28.00
1.no
42.00
8.50
6.50
15.50
DECEMBER 71
FARE R
22.74 L
30.50 N
42.00
8.50
15.50
18.50
18.50
15.50
35.00
42.00
QK 8.50
11.00
11.00
32.00
12.00 L
35.00 N
MV - Du
28.00
20 nn
TO -FROM FARE R CM FARE 'R CM FARE R CM
AUG - 80524.00 L EX 24.00 L EX 26.00 E EX
- HYA 30.50 N 30.50 N 30.50 N
- LEW
- MVY . 32.00 N
-NY 42.00 N 42.00 N 42.00 N
-PWM 8.50 L QK 8.50 L EX 8.50 L EX
-WVL 8.00 L EX 8.00 L EX 8.00 L EX
SOS - BTV 28.00 E EX
- HYA 15.50 N 15.50 N 16.00 E EX
- LEB 21.00 E EX
- LEW
- MVY 18.50 L EX 20.00 N 21.00 G EX
- MPV 24.00 E EX
- ACK 18.50 L EX 20.00 N 21.00 N
- EWB 15.00 N 15.50 L OL 15.50 L OL
- NY 35.00 G PM 35.00 G PM
- PWR
- WVL 26.00 L EX 26.00 L EX 28.00 E EX
BTV - .LEB 15.00 L EX
- MPV 8.00 L EX
HYA - LEB 28.00 N
- MY 11.00 L NE 11.00 N 11.00 L DL
HYA - MPV 32.00 N
- ACK 11.00 L NE 12.51 N 12.51 E EX
- ENB 11.00 N 11.00 N 11.00 N
- NY 32.00 G NE 32.00 N 32.00 G DL
- WVL 32.75 N 32.75 N
LEB - MPV 8.00 L EX
- NY 30.00 G DL
LEN - PWM
-WVL
MVY - ACK 11.00 E EX, 11.00 N 11.00 L OL
- EWB 11.00 N 12.00 N 12.00 N
-NY 32.00 G NE 35.00 N 35.00 G DL
-WVL 34.25 N
MPV - NY 36.00 N
ACK - EWS. 12.00 N 15.00 N 15.00 N
- NY 35.00 G NE 35.00 N 35.00 G DL
EWS - NY 28.00 G NE 28.00 G DL 28.00 G OL
NY - PWM 39.00 IG NE 39.00 G DL 39.00 G DL
iic 72 DECEMBCR 72 JUNE 73
DICIMIR 73 JUNE 74 DECEMBER 74
TO - FARF R CM FARE R CM FARE R CM 45
AUG - BOS 26.00 L EX 29.00 N 29.00 N
- HYA
-LEW - 9.00 N 9.00 N
-MY
- NY 42.00 N 47.00 N 47.00 N
- PWM 8.50 L EX 10.00 N 10.00 N
- WVL 8.00 L EX 9.00 N 9.00 N
SOS - STV 28.00 L EX 31.00 G DL 31.00 G DL
- HYA 16.00 N 18.00 N 18.00 N
- LEB 21.00 L EX 23.00 N 23.00 N
- LEW 27.00 N 27.00 N
- MVY 21.00 N 23.00 N 23.00 N
- NPV 24.00 L EX 27.00 N 27.00 N
- ACK 21.00 N 23.00 N 23.00 N
- EWS 15.50 L DL 18.00 G DL 18.00 E DL
- NY 35.00 G PM 40.00 G PM 40.00 G PM
- PWM 21.00 G DL 21.00 E DL
- WVL 28.00 L EX 31.00 N 31.00 N
BTV - LEB 11.00 L EX 16.00 N 14.81 N
- MPV 8.00 L EX 9.00 N 7.00 N
HYA - LEB
- MY 11.00 N 13.00 L DL 13.00 N
HYA - MPV
- ACK 12.50 N 14.00 L DL 14.00 N
- EWB 11.00 N 14.00 N 14.00 N
- NY 32.00 N 36.00 G DL 36.00 N
- WVL
LEB - MPV 8.00 N 9.00 N 9.00 N
- NY 30.00 G DL 34.00 G DL 34.00 G DL
LEW - PWM 9.00 N 9.00 N
- WVL 16.00 N 14.81 N
MVY - ACK 11.00 N - 13.00 L DL 13.00 N
- EWB 12.00 N 13.00 N 13.00 N
- NY 35.00 N 39.00 G DL 39.00 N
- WVL
MPV - NY 36.00 N 40.00 N 40.00 N
ACK - EWB 15.00 N 17.00 N 17.00 N
- NY 35.00 N 39.00 G DL 39.00 N
EWB - NY 28.00 G D1. 32.00 G DL 32.00 G
NY - PWM G.00 44.00 G DL 44.00 G OL
PWM - WVL 17.00 IN DL
4. AIRCRAFT FLEET, TRAFFIC, AND FINANCIAL STATUS
Air New England began operations with a fleet of the larger of the
commuter aircraft, three Twin Otters (DHC-6's) and one Beech 99, plus two
C-45's and an Aero Commander. It used the Twin Otters and B-99 for scheduled
passenger traffic. (Of these aircraft, only one of the used Twin Otters was
purchased.) Although Air New England was a brand new airline competing
against Executive Airlines, which at that time had a fleet over twice its
size, it did not hesitate to open operations with comparable aircraft, rather
than a mix of smaller aircraft such as Cessna 402's.
By the end of its first year of operations Air New England had innovated
the use of old DC-3's, which it bought and refurbished extensively and used
successfully in the Islands market. By March of 1972 Ai-r New England was
flying DC-3's, Twin Otters and B-99's exclusively in passenger service.
The success of Air New England in its competitive strategy against
Executive during the first critical year, 1971, can best be shown by an
examination of comparative statistics for 1971 of Air New England and Executive.
Tables 4-1 and 4-2 show the total passengers enplaned and deplaned at the points
served by both airlines and the city pair market shares. By concentrating on the
Islands market, Air New England was able to capture almost 60% ofthis market
in its first year of operation, although Executive was still carrying more
overall passengers on its network.
Despite its substantial revenues, Executive's losses were mounting
steadily. Table 4-3 shows the income statements for both companies. Although
the percentages of expenses for flying operations and aircraft and traffic
servicing were about the same for both airlines, the percentages are almost
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perfectly reversed for maintenance and general and administrative, showing
the relatively lean corporate overhead at Air New England. The overall loss
as a percentage of total revenue is shownto be substantially higher for
Executive.
Figure 4-4 shows that passenger yield for both airlines, on a system
basis, was comparable during 1971, with both airlines displaying seasonality
in their yield, rising in the summer passenger months when the higher yielding
Islands market was peaking. However, Table 4-5 reveals that operating expenses
per passenger flown on Executive were nearly double those of Air New England.
Thus although Air New England's competitive strategy may have hastened the
initial bankruptcy of Executive in December 1971, Executive's high
operating expenses were the ultimate cause.
Although Executive remained as a commuter air carrier in New England fol-
lowing the voluntary bankruptcy, and continued carrying a substantial number of
passengers, its corporate image was substantially damaged. Air New England
had gained greater market acceptance as a responsible carrier for the rest of
its competitive fight with Executive.
During the summer of 1972 Air New England (Tables 4-6 and 4-7) almost
doubled its capacity by purchasing two additional DC-3's and two more used
Twin Otters. Table 4-8, the balance sheet for Air New England (March 72), reveals
that the financing for the purchases of the aircraft came basically from long
term debt to banks. The initial financing for Air New England came basically
from equity investments made by two major stockholders, Mssrs. Kanzler of
Michigan and Dickinson of New Jersey, who continued to make equity investments in
,oil, 1,110= 011, Ihi ",
Air New England throughout this entire period. However, aircraft purchases
continued to be made through long term bank debt instruments through 1974.
Air New England's fleet consisted of a mixture of both leased and purchased
aircraft. Air New England purchased two used B-99's for service in the North
markets in late 1972. During the remainder of its history as a commuter air
carrier, it purchased two additional used Twin Otters in early 1973 getting ready
for the summer season and made no further purchases of aircraft until the summer
of 1974, at which time its total fleet consisted of 5 DC-3's, 9 Twin Otters, and
4 B-99's. (The Aero Commanders, which were leased, were used for charter work
only.) Thus, additional lift capacity was added through acquisition of more of the
same types of small aircraft, rather than switching to larger aircraft, which
may have been possible under CAB exemption.
The purchase of the aircraft kept pace with the passenger traffic growth
at Air New England, as seen below. The rapid growth in 1974 came after
Executive went out of business.
Estimated Traffic Growth
Year Revenue Passengers
1971 90,000
1972 150,000
1973 200,000
1974 320,000
The financial position of Air New England was steadily improving as
well. The net loss experienced during the start-up year of 1971 ($448,000)
_MAI A
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was in fact the highest experienced up to mid-1974. A comparison of the
income statements for the eight months ended August 31 of each year, given
below, indicates that Air New England was keeping its operating expenses under
Revenues
Expenses
Net Profit (Loss)
Income Statements (8 months)
1972 1973
2,020,034 3,088,151
1,818,407 2,843,215
50,973 (188,164)
control, and with the steadily expanding revenues, could be expected to
become a substantially profitable operation after five years of operation
as a commuter air carrier.
1974
5,977,300
4,675,443
771,164
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Table 4-1
Total Passengers Enplaned & Deplaned by Quarter in 1971
First Quarter
ANE
2,417
4,008
4,266
3,708
1,204
731
890
17,224
Second Quarter
Airport EX
48,493
4,848
2,121
1,437
2,065
5,381
13,477
4,898
2,278
3,891
5,711
3,146
97,746
ANE
7,076
8,637
8,747
2,720
8,093
2,922
1,194
989
40,378
EX
48,482
9,847
3,697
2,570
4,844
761
6,562
6,099
5,542
2,649
4,493
5,868
3,899
105,316
Major Hub
BOS
NY
Islands
HYA
MVY
ACK
EWB
North
AUG
BTV
LEB
LEW
MPV
PWM
WVL
TOTAL
I imliim.-1
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Table 4-1 (cont.)
1971
Third Quarter
ANE EX
18,079
11,941
16,690
8,250
15,194
4,585
Major Hub
BOS
NY
Islands
HYA
MVY
ACK
EWB
North
AUG
BTV
LEB
LEW
MPV
PWM
WVL
1,116
62,233
15,216
15,216
12,799
18,230
1,740
7,230
3,366
5,949
2,572
4,297
5,541
3,998
Fourth Quarter
ANE EX
7,909
7,859
8,318
2,859
9,410
3,022
1,029
718
30,515
6,685
1,789
807
1,694
504
4,548
3,541
4,543
1,988
3,045
3,468
3,337
1971 Total
ANE EX
35,481
32,445
38,021
13,829
36,405
11,733
4,557
3,713
189,723
36,596
17,162
17,613
26,833
3,005
23,721
26,483
20,932
9,487
15,726
20,588
14,380
66,464 176,184 422,249
.mill, II
Airport
1,603
77,458 152,726 41,124TOTAL
Table 4-2
Total Origin and Destination Traffic for 1971*
'Islands Market'
City Pair ANE % Market EX % Market
Boston - HYA 14,243 54.5 11,910 45.5
MUY 6,598 34.7 12,429 65.3
ACK 13,752 43.9 17,505 56.1
EWB 691 100 0
NY 2 100 0
HYA - AUG 3 100 0
MUY 723 81.1 168 18.9
ACK 15,090 79.9 3,778 20.1
EWB 198 57.5 146 42.5
NY 7,764 87.1 1,147 12.9
NY - MVY 5,201 65.1 2,783 34.9
- ACK 4,133 63.4 2,387 36.6
- EWB 7,657 84.3 1,427 15.7
MUY - ACK 775 26.9 2,105 73.1
- EWB 532 68.5 245 31.5
ACK - EWB 2,655 72.2 1,021 27.8
TOTAL 80,017 58.4% 57,051 41.6%
* Source: CAB Docket 22973
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Table 4-3
Income Statement for 1971***
ANE
Operating Revenues:
Passenger
Charter
Air Freight
Other
Total Revenue
Operating Expenses
Flying Operations
Maintenance
Aircraft & Traffic Servicing
General & Administrative
Operating Expenses
Operating Profit (Loss)
Depreciation
Interest Expense
Other
1,693,364
84,453
41,848
22,532
1,842,197
1,012,030
487,916
309,404
367,104
2,176,454
91.9
4.6
2.3
1.2
100.0
6,353,636
311,468
404,321
344,123
7,413,548
46.5 5,565,587
22.4 1,618,504
14.2 1,696,381
16.9 2,395,741
100.0 10,276,213
(334,257) 18.1* (2,862,665)
86,228
29,904
( 2,381)
(448,008)Net Loss
25.4** 1,023,229
(3,885,894)
* % of Total Revenue
** % of Net Loss
*** Source: CAB Docket 22973
85.7
4.2
5.5
4.6
100.0
44.4
15.8
16.5
23.3
100.0
38.6*
26.3**
ifl 11111,
Table 4-4*
System Yield ( c/RPM )
1971 ANE EX
January 14.3 14.3
February 14.2 N.A
March 15.4 N.A.
April 14.8 14.4
May 15.3 N.A.
June 15.7 17.0
July 16.9 17.3
August 16.8 16.4
September 16.3 16.2
October 15.1 15.4
November 15.5 15.2
December 15.2 14.5
* Source: CAB Docket 22973
"Imp-
55
Table 4-5
Operating Expense per Passenger Flown, 1971*
ANE EX
Total number of passengers
Operating Expenses ($)
Flying Operations
Maintenance
Aircraft & Traffic Servicing
General Administrative
Total Operating Expenses
88,092 1232,489
11.49
5.54
3.51
4.17
24.71
19.64
6.96
7.30
10.30
44.20
1) Includes traffic for Albany, Keene, Manchester, Monticello & Pittsfield.
* Source: CAB Docket 22973
% > ANE
68.7%
25.6%
108.0%
147.0%
.1011 9111" 1 11111''
Table 4-6
Air New England Aircraft In Use*
Total
Passenger
Seats
Quarter Ending Aircraft Available
12/31/70 3 Twin Otter DHC 6-200 57
1 Beech 99 15
2 C 45 (Beech 18)
1 Aero Commander 500 B
3/31/71 same 72
6/30/71 same
9/30/71 2 DC-3 60
3 DHC 6-200 57
1 B-99 15
2 C-45
2 AC 500 B
12/31/71 same 132
3/31/72 2 DC-3 60
2 DHC 6-200 38
2 B-99 30
2 AC 500 B
128
6/30/72 4 DC-3 120
4 DHC 6-200 76
2 B-99 30
2 AC 500 B
9/30/72 same 226
12/31/72 4 DC-3 120
4 DHC 6-200 76
3 B-99 45
2 AC 500 B
241
3/31/73 4 DC-3 120
6 DHC 6-200 114
4 B-99 60
2 AC 500 B 2
6/30/73 4 DC-3 120
7 DHC 6-200 133
4 B-99 60
2 AC 500 B
313
91/30u/7 a same
El
Table 4-6 (cont.)
Total Passenger
Quarter Ending Aircraft Seats Available
12/31/73 same
3/31/74 4 DC-3 120
6 DHC 6-200 114
4 B-99 60
2 AC 500 B
294
6/30/74 5 DC-3 150
8 DHC 6-200 152
4 B-99 60
2 AC 500 B
362
* Source: CAB Forms 298 C, Quarterly 1971-1974
(Aircraft shown are both owned and leased)
Table 4-7
Date
Air New England *Aircraft Purchases of
Type
DHC-6
DC- 3
DC-3
B-99
DC- 3
DHC-6
DC-3
DHC-6
B-99
B-99
DHC-6
DHC-6
DHC-6
DHC-6
* Source: CAB Form 41, Schedule B-43, 3/31/75
(These aircraft were purchased prior to July 19, 1974 and
owned as of 3/31/75. Cost shown excludes engines. The
average price per engine for the B-99's and DHC-6's was
$40,000; for the DC-3's, $15,000.)
Cost
$205,437
112,369
87,951
164,663
77,519
154,154
87,584
171,114
213,909
192,770
200,605
190,058
374,670
377,170
11/70
7/71
7/71
2/72
5/72
5/72
6/72
9/72
11/72
11/72
2/73
2/73
7/74
7/74
Table 4-8
AIR NEW ENGLAND, INC.*
BALANCE SHEET
March, 1972
ASSETS
March 1972
Current Assets:
Cash
Accounts Receivable:
General Traffic
Interline
Other
Less Reserve for Uncollectable
Stock Subscriptions
Inventories
Prepaid Assets
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS
Fixed Assets:
Aircraft
Cost
950,265
Ground Property 39,958
Buildings 78,654
Leasehold Improvements 15,110
Construction in Progress 224,297
TOTAL FIXED ASSETS 1,308,284
$53,812
140,250
25,671
$81,804
201,032
125,000
53,046
76,963
$219,733
18,701
$ 537,845
Depr
64,140
3,962
5,550
3,995
77,647
Net
886,125
35,996
73,104
11,115
224,297
$ 1,230,637
Other Assets:
Long Term Security Deposits
Pre Operating Costs
Corporate Organizational Expense
Aircraft Integration Costs
Building Integration Costs
TOTAL OTHER ASSETS
$ 21,930
14,892
1,084
83,904
5,037
$126,847
TOTAL ASSETS
*Source: CAB Docket 22973
Table 4-8 (continued) LIABILITIES AND EQUITY
March, 1972
Current Liabilities
Notes Payable - Current
Accounts Payable:
Trade
Interline
Other
Accrued Expenses:
Payroll & Payroll Taxes
Other
Engine Overhaul
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES
Long Term Liabilities:
Notes Payable:
Norfolk County Trust
Cape Cod Bank and Trust
New England Merchants
Other
Convertible Debentures
TOTAL LONG TERM LIABILITIES
TOTAL LIABILITIES
$ 106,008
157,270
61,224
536
42,806
51,540
82,824
$ 502,208
$ 232,803
115,903
508,000
100,000
$ 956,706
$ 1,458,914
Stockholder Equity:
Common Stock - Authorized
Issued and Outstanding
Paid in Capital
Accumulated Profit or (Loss)
TOTAL STOCKHOLDER EQUITY
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITY
506,250
618,750
(688,585)
$ 436,415
$ 1,895,329
V
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5. SUMMARY
The success of Air New England from the beginning of its corporate
life to the summer of 1974, when it was offered a certificate of public
convenience and necessity by the CAB, can be attributed to a number of
factors. The foremost was capable management. The management team at
Air New England had previous experience operating commuter airlines
in the New England area and was aware of the two major pitfalls that would
undermine profitability, excess capacity and high corporate overhead, and
was careful to avoid them. Further, the regulatory environment in which
the commuters operated was such as to allow various comptetitive marketing
strategies to be tried by management, such as modifying fare structures,
flying different routings, and changing frequencies on routes. Additionally,
the area chosen for initial market penetration, the Cape and Islands, was
dense enough to support a number of airlines during the peak season, and
allowed Air New England to minimize its start-up losses.
Air New England's management was, of course, aware of the financial
situation at Executive, its major established competitor. Air New
England realized that if it was able to control its own costs, the finan-
cial difficulties that had existed at Executive during previous years would
eventually lead to the disappearance of that particular competitor. (Of course,
the possibility always existed that new commuters could also appear.) Thus,
the emergence of Air New England as the dominant commuter air carrier in
New England was a combination of management skills in all areas of airline
,lift ,11 , 111J1 , 1 1  111 6 1, mim I
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operations combined with mismanagement on the part of their competitors.
In the summer of 1974 Air New England's future was bright.
